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Like Gaul, corporate law scholarship can be divided into three 
overflowing buckets: pro-manager, pro-shareholder, and empirical. We 
classify empirical scholarship as a separate category, in significant part 
because of Professor Randall Thomas. 
In the pre-Thomas era, much of the literature fell into the first 
two buckets, with empirical researchers deploying data collection and 
analysis to support their particular bent. Then Professor Thomas 
emerged as a distinctive empiricist. Throughout his career, he has 
published scores of pathbreaking studies while maintaining relative 
neutrality as to the normative implications. He does not deploy data 
and its analysis to advocate for particular positions, but instead maps 
the terrain in which policy can then be considered. Thus, Professor 
Thomas’s category of scholarship is the third way—a balanced approach 
to generating and assessing evidence, without a particular viewpoint. 
We focus here on two areas of empirical exploration of the 
shareholder franchise, shareholder rights to sue and vote, where 
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Professor Thomas has contributed richly and without polemics—as a 
neutral umpire calling balls and strikes. We show how his work has 
helped depolarize the division between managerialists and shareholder 
rights advocates.  
I. SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
No topic in the business sphere touches a raw nerve as sharply 
and frequently as shareholder litigation. Even though shareholder suits 
include individual shareholder claims, the focus of concern and 
complaints is derivative suits and class actions focusing on various 
forms of alleged breaches of fiduciary duty under state law or fraud 
claims under the federal securities laws. 
Skepticism of shareholder suits, however, precedes the 
contemporary concern about shareholder deal litigation. The fount of 
this skepticism is likely not the prevalence of suits, as how can a large 
number of suits in isolation tell us much about whether they are 
abusive? Rather, the foundation for distrust of shareholder suits is the 
poor incentive structure that surrounds all forms of shareholder suits. 
With the exception of the securities law class action, the suit’s plaintiff 
invariably has too little at stake in shareholder suits to be an adequate 
monitor of the suit’s counsel. Moreover, with such a small ownership 
interest in the corporation, the plaintiff suffers no observable loss of 
wealth when the defense cost of the suit visits significant financial 
burdens on the corporation. And, though in derivative suits there is a 
requirement that the plaintiff be “adequate,” that standard only 
eliminates the most egregious shareholder from representing the 
corporation’s claim. Furthermore, the well-entrenched contingency fee 
arrangement encourages entrepreneurial litigation by plaintiff firms 
who manage and judge their success not on the individual case but on 
a portfolio of suits. Within such a portfolio there is room for the high-
payout, long-shot suit. Finally, under the American Rule, losing a suit 
only rarely leads to sanctions, so the disciplining force of assigning costs 
to the loser is absent.  
Before Professor Thomas’s various studies, there were wide, 
unchallenged beliefs shaping public policy surrounding shareholder 
suits. For example, the hearings leading up to the passage of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”)1 included testimony that 
securities class actions were filed, and quickly, after companies 
experienced a ten percent or greater decline in stock price, regardless 
 
 1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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of the cause of that decline.2 A frequently cited law journal article 
questioned whether the merits of such suits mattered, based on a 
slender sample of suits with various amounts of damages all settling for 
the same low percentage.3 Professor Roberta Romero skewered 
derivative suits on the ground that the average settlement in her study 
was $9 million (with the median being $2 million), and these were 
characterized as small in light of the size of the firm’s assets; she also 
noted that most settlements included fee awards to the plaintiff’s 
attorney.4 She believed the facts, in combination, were consistent with 
the belief “that a significant proportion of [the] shareholder suits are 
without merit.”5 
The above describes the popular image of shareholder litigation 
when Professor Thomas and his co-investigators began a series of 
studies of shareholder litigation in state and federal courts.  
A. State Fiduciary Claims 
Claims of abuse premised on recoveries being but a few million 
dollars or the prosecuting attorney being paid as part of the terms of 
the settlement seem hardly definitive on the social benefit of 
shareholder suits. In contrast, the study Professors Robert Thompson 
and Thomas conducted of all complaints filed in the Delaware Chancery 
Court in 1999 and 2000 significantly increased our understanding of 
state law shareholder litigation by being the first such study to 
distinguish public companies from private firms when examining 
characteristics of class actions, derivative suits, and direct actions.6 
They found that about eighty percent of derivative suits in the study 
period involved public companies and, whereas about one-third of 
private derivative suits ended with some relief being granted, 
recoveries were slightly lower, at twenty-eight percent, for derivative 
suits involving public companies.7 Within these groups, when monetary 
 
 2. See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 
499–500 (1997) (reviewing testimony before Congress in hearings preceding ultimate enactment 
of the PSLRA). 
 3. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 516–17 (1991) (examining eight settlements, two of which fell 
substantially below the settlement range of 20.06–27.35 percent for the other six settlements).  
 4. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 55, 61 (1991) (describing the settlements’ “striking features”). Romano further observed 
that “[t]he principal beneficiaries of the litigation . . . appear to be [the plaintiffs’] attorneys.” Id. 
at 84. 
 5. Id. at 61. 
 6. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative 
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747 (2004).  
 7. Id. at 1762, 1767 tbl.6, 1776 tbl.12. 
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relief was granted, it summed to millions of dollars for both public and 
private derivative suit proceedings.8 However, the paucity of derivative 
suits in the nonpublic sector caused the authors to observe that “private 
company derivative litigation in Delaware plays little role in the 
governance of these firms.”9 Indeed, they reported that direct suits 
occur three times more frequently than suits raising derivative 
claims,10 a result they surmised may reflect the Delaware courts’ 
emphasis on private ordering in close corporations.11 Public companies 
lack the intimacy that exists in private firms, which means that public 
companies do not have the expectations between managers and owners 
that commonly anchor direct claims in private firms. Hence, claims in 
public firms are normatively based so that, with the exception of well-
pled allegations of self-dealing, managers enjoy a high presumption of 
propriety under the ubiquitous business judgment rule.12 Derivative 
suits involving public corporations were found frequently to involve 
multiple suits arising from the same transaction, and their prosecution 
was concentrated among several law firms.13  
Moreover, despite the continuing debate about how states can 
best approach the historical requirement of a pre-suit demand on the 
board of directors before initiating suit, Professors Thomas and 
Thompson found that failure to make a demand represented about one-
fourth of the cases dismissed without relief; suits involving claims of 
self-dealing transactions or other conflicts of interest fared much better 
than did complaints outside these classic duty of loyalty claims.14 They 
thus concluded, “Overall . . . demand does not appear to be carrying as 
much of the weight of derivative litigation as one might think given the 
attention devoted to that topic in the academic literature and case 
commentary.”15 Reflecting on the effect of the demand requirement, 
they wrote: 
[T]he bulk of all public company derivative suits challenge conflict of interest 
transactions, and in those derivative cases that produce affirmative relief, the majority of 
them relate to acquisition transactions, in which the plaintiffs allege that a control 
shareholder group has a conflict of interest. Acquisitions involve directors in a final period 
 
 8. See id. at 1777 tbl.13A, 1778 tbl.13B (charting monetary relief in derivative suits against 
public corporations and large private corporations). 
 9. Id. at 1767. 
 10. Id. at 1785 (“There were about twice as many direct actions filed against private 
companies as there were derivative actions. When those cases that include both direct and 
derivative counts are eliminated, the margin of direct suits over derivative suits increases to a 
three-to-one margin.”). 
 11. Id. at 1767, 1793. 
 12. See id. at 1780–81.  
 13. Id. at 1768–69. 
 14. See id. at 1783. 
 15. Id. 
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problem, in which the law could have a greater role, even if there are independent 
directors. These cases almost uniformly allege breaches of the duty of loyalty by 
directors.16 
In contrast, claims of failure to monitor made up a minority of 
the filed cases in their study, which reflects the long odds of such suits 
ending successfully.17 The authors attributed this to the demand 
requirement and suggested that it may be overemphasizing the role 
that independent directors can play in insightfully and dispassionately 
considering management’s conduct.18 They thus proposed excusing the 
demand requirement for public companies when suit is brought by a 
holder of one percent or more of the company’s shares.19  
Professors Thomas and Thompson thus documented fairly clear 
and understandable trends in the experience of the corporate derivative 
suit. Evidence that claims tend to be individual and not corporate in 
nature in private corporations, the very different outcomes in self-
dealing versus oversight claims, and the more limited role of the 
demand requirement in combination describe a system that is both 
nuanced and discriminating, not one that is driven by extortion and 
expediency. This characterization flows from their more textured 
inquiry as compared to tallying raw outcomes in settlements. 
In The New Look of Shareholder Litigation, Professors Thomas 
and Thompson were in the vanguard of academics performing studies 
of merger and acquisition litigation by separately investigating 
multiple facets of acquisitions that comprised ninety-four percent of the 
824 class action suits in their 1999–2000 database.20 The analysis of 
this large subset of their database found several important features 
unique to deal litigation: there was a “tremendous number of 
acquisition-oriented class action lawsuits filed in . . . Delaware”;21 the 
suits were filed quickly following a deal’s announcement;22 there were 
multiple suits attacking the same transaction, parroting language 
found in earlier-filed complaints;23 such deal litigation was 
 
 16. Id. at 1786. 
 17. See id. at 1773. 
 18. Id. at 1789–90. 
 19. See id. at 1790. 
 20. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: 
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 168, 169 tbl.2 (2004) (finding equally 
significant that acquisition cases made up over seventy-six percent of all fiduciary duty cases 
litigated in the 1999–2000 data set). 
 21. Id. at 181. 
 22. Id. at 182 (finding that “70 percent . . . are filed within three days of the announcement” 
and on average are filed more quickly than derivative suits). 
 23. See id. at 183–84 (correlating the number of suits attacking a single transaction with deal 
size and whether a bidder has also sued). 
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concentrated among about a dozen plaintiffs’ law firms;24 and deal 
litigation was on average of significantly shorter duration, with less 
evidence of activity on the part of their lawyers than in other 
shareholder suits.25 These factors could have been invoked to support 
the claim that deal litigation is not just vexatious, but baseless. The 
great contribution of the study was that its findings debunked that 
broadside. Their close analysis of the data established not only that fee 
awards correlate with the relative strengths of the underlying claim, 
but that deal litigation yields monetary relief in exactly the class of 
cases such relief would be expected: where a substantial underpayment 
was suggested by the deal premium being too small.26 Moreover, the 
law firms that were involved in large numbers of the cases had, on 
average, enviable records in terms of the suit producing meaningful 
relief to the class, and the likelihood that there would be additional 
consideration paid to the shareholders was correlated with the number 
of lawsuits filed challenging a transaction.27 They further documented 
that the deals most vulnerable to suits and resulting monetary 
recoveries were those that involved self-dealing acquisitions, such as 
acquisition by a control person or a management buyout.28 In a later 
publication focused on deals in the same 1999–2000 period, Professor 
Thomas and his coauthors found that litigation occurred in about ten 
percent of the deals, reduced the likelihood the transaction would be 
consummated, and increased the return to shareholders.29  
Now, two decades later, there is reason to believe the 
composition of deal litigation is quite different from what it was in 
1999–2000. Contemporary studies show a quantum increase in deal 
litigation. For example, a study of such acquisitions occurring in 2012 
found that ninety-three percent of transactions in excess of $100 million 
were the subject of a shareholder suit.30 Because it is hard to believe 
that business mores declined precipitously in the intervening twelve-
year period, the surmise, supported by some concrete data, is that the 
 
 24. See id. at 185–87 (showing that sixteen firms maintained at least twenty such suits). 
Moreover, some plaintiffs appear multiple times. Id. at 188 tbl.13. 
 25. See id. at 189–91 (examining the timeframe for settlement and dismissal). 
 26. Id. at 194, 201. 
 27. See id. at 197 (noting the success of the top sixteen plaintiffs’ firms and correlating 
monetary recovery and the number of suits filed in an acquisition). 
 28. See id. at 200–04 (analyzing control of shareholder transactions). 
 29. See C.N.V. Krishnan, Ronald W. Masulis, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, 
Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1248, 1264–65 (2012) 
(discussing the study’s conclusions).  
 30. ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS 1 (2013), http://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/2012-Shareholder-
Litigation-Involving-M-and-A [https://perma.cc/4LSE-ZADK].  
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observed epidemic of deal litigation is lawyer driven and not due to a 
rise in overreaching misconduct.31 Contrary to the findings of Professors 
Thomas and Thompson, a study of deal litigation spawned by 
transactions in 2005–2013 found that increases in consideration 
happened less frequently in such suits, with the most common remedy 
being supplemental disclosures surrounding the transaction or 
amendments in merger terms.32 This evidence suggests litigation is at 
least trending into the vexatious realm, an observation made more 
plausible by the benchmarking provided by the earlier Thomas and 
Thompson study. Another trend captured by more recent work by 
Professor Thomas and his coauthors is that this litigation has migrated, 
and quickly, outside of Delaware and particularly to federal courts, 
where the focus is on incomplete disclosures in the proxy materials 
accompanying shareholder approval of the transaction.33 
In 2012, Professors Thomas and Thompson returned to the 
subject of the lawyers’ role in burgeoning shareholder litigation by 
investigating the forces that guide a plaintiff’s choice among the various 
forums in which shareholder litigation may take place.34 In a federal 
system, choice abounds, and in the sphere of corporate law, does so in 
both federal courts and state courts; independent of possibly lodging in 
federal court a state-based fiduciary claim on the basis of diversity 
jurisdiction, substantive federal securities disclosure claims regularly 
spring from behavior triggering state fiduciary claims. Their paper thus 
provided a coherent theory of, and justification for, the recent epidemic 
of multiforum litigation and did so in the context of telling the evolving 
story of how the substance and procedure of litigation morphs through 
time in response to a variety of judicial and legislative responses to 
litigation development. For example, they reasoned that Matsushita 
 
 31. Cf. Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn 
Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
557, 561 (2015) (finding that the typical relief provided in settlement of merger suits—amendment 
of the terms, supplemental disclosure, or increase in consideration—does not impact or only 
weakly impacts shareholder vote); Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of 
Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 873 (2014) (finding no 
correlation between the premium shareholders receive in a merger and the likelihood of a class 
action challenging the merger).  
 32. Fisch et al., supra note 31, at 566. 
 33. See Mathew Cain, Jill Fisch, Steven Davidoff & Randall S. Thomas, The Shifting Tides 
of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 621–629 (2018) (attributing noticeable migration of 
deal litigation from Delaware state courts to wide adoption of forum selection clauses and In re 
Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016), which established that disclosure-
only settlements will henceforth be viewed with disfavor and withheld approval of settlement and 
attorney fees to underscore the newly announced position). 
 34. See Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder 
Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753 (2012). 
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Electrical Industrial Co. v. Epstein35 stimulated multiforum litigation 
by holding that a state court global settlement was entitled to full faith 
and credit even though that settlement included claims the court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear.36 Another force driving the explosion of deal 
litigation is that the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision effectively 
foreclosed smaller plaintiffs’ firms from lucrative securities fraud 
practice; hence, they shifted their focus to deal litigation or to “tagalong” 
derivative suits based on state law claims that the board failed to 
monitor management’s disclosure practices and/or the operational 
practices that gave rise to the event underlying the claimed 
misrepresentation.37 Thus, we see that a change in substantive law 
(Matsushita) and procedural law (the lead plaintiff provision) changed 
the composition, but not the frequency, of shareholder litigation. 
Professors Thomas and Thompson explained that the problem is not the 
number of deals attracting litigation but the amount of 
multijurisdictional litigation38 and reasoned that the motive of 
multijurisdictional litigation is that a second set of attorneys can garner 
a piece of the pool of fees the litigation might be expected to generate.39 
Their explanation was that today’s explosion of multiforum, multi-type 
shareholder suits is a strategy for a zero-sum game. The resort to 
multiple suits from the same transaction is not the traditional quest for 
a better or different body of law; it is a strategy to garner fees.40 They 
referred to this as “fee distribution litigation.”41 It is a means by which 
smaller, newer firms can participate in the pool of fees, playing on the 
defendant’s wish for peace through a “global settlement.”42 Their 
explanation does not invoke the traditional arguments surrounding 
forum shopping, in which there is great sensitivity to states 
entertaining the suits as a means to advance the state interest that 
underpins the contested rules of law that are at the center of the 
litigation.43 In corporate litigation, it is invariably the state of 
 
 35. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).  
 36. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 34, at 1766. Subsequently, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held that classes party to securities law claims that settled in Delaware state 
courts were adequately represented, meaning the settlement barred further litigation of the 
matter. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 37. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 34, at 1774–75 (describing the increased frequency 
of federal securities class actions with additional derivative state law claims). 
 38. Id. at 1789. 
 39. See id. at 1797–98 (explaining “fee distribution litigation”). 
 40. See id. at 1798 (“To succeed in the business, new firms must therefore find a way to obtain 
a slice of the attorneys’ fees that are being generated from the limited pool of good, settlement-
worthy cases.”). 
 41. Id. at 1797. 
 42. Id. at 1799. 
 43. Id. at 1794–95. 
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incorporation’s policies that govern the substantive content of the 
case.44 Thus any state interest would be that of the state of 
incorporation in wishing its laws were interpreted to reflect the 
domicile’s interest. They reasoned that this strategy persists because, 
outside the federal court system, there is no way to consolidate 
multistate court proceedings.45 They then considered several antidotes 
to the problem, such as forum selection bylaws (still in their infancy 
when the article was written), collateral attacks on settlements that 
threaten to preclude a pending suit, judicial comity, embracing lead 
plaintiff procedures for state proceedings, and legislation authorizing a 
means to centralize shareholder suits in a designated forum.46 
As we look back on the substantial empirical data Professor 
Thomas has gathered through his studies on state-based shareholder 
claims, we see how his work has shifted the focus of debate. Professors 
Thomas and Thompson’s theory of fee distribution litigation certainly 
lends support to the long-held view that a fundamental weakness in 
representative suits is weak incentives, especially on the part of the 
plaintiffs’ bar. This is further underscored by their finding that most 
Delaware derivative suits are filed by a cadre of well-financed plaintiffs’ 
firms and are filed very quickly, likely too quickly, after a transaction’s 
announcement.47 At the same time, Professor Thomas’s earlier work 
shows that the judicial system wisely discriminates based on the nature 
of claims, meaning that transactions involving self-dealing are, as they 
likely should be, subject to closer scrutiny so that the demand 
requirement does not overregulate derivative suit litigation.48 And their 
data documented that settlements occur in derivative suits and involve 
amounts that are not trivial; it also revealed that derivative suits in 
public companies tend to arise from single-event, self-dealing matters 
and, as such, are not likely to produce as much damage to the 
corporation as can be expected in care-based suits alleging failure to 
monitor on the part of directors or managers.49 Nonetheless, the 
explosion of multiforum deal litigation can be seen as demonstrating 
that the hallowed record of shareholder suits captured in the early work 
of Professors Thomas and Thompson quickly bred abusive litigation, at 
 
 44. Id. at 1778–79. 
 45. Id. at 1790. 
 46. See id. at 1802–17 (setting forth proposed solutions).  
 47. See id. at 1781.  
 48. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 20, at 195–207 (discussing in the acquisition context 
how the nature of the claim prosecuted—such as self-dealing versus failure to aggressively pursue 
other suitors, as well as whether self-dealing is involved—is associated with very different 
outcomes). 
 49. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 34, at 1775–76.  
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least in the area of shareholder challenges to deals. Because these are 
not derivative suits, but rather individual claims that are aggregated 
in class actions, reform does not appear necessary for derivative suits 
(recall that Professors Thomas and Thompson find that this procedural 
device has a more limited role in private companies).50 Such reform 
would do well to have as its goal a return to the experiences of deal-
based suits first examined by Professors Thomas and Thompson.  
B. Federal Securities Class Actions 
 Professor Thomas coauthored more than a dozen studies of 
securities class actions that have profoundly changed the debate 
surrounding these suits. To be sure, efforts to rid the courts of securities 
class actions have not abated, but arguments against the suits are now 
framed in terms of macroeconomic concerns such as innovation, 
aggregation of capital, and the shrinking number of public companies. 
As discussed earlier, not that long ago, securities class actions were 
claimed to extort quick settlements in which the merits did not 
matter.51 A crucial finding in Does the Plaintiff Matter? was that 
settlement amounts are explained significantly by the amount of loss 
suffered by the class.52 The merits not only matter but, per the study’s 
regressions, they matter a lot. This finding rejects so much of the debate 
that propelled consideration and ultimate reform of securities class 
actions through the PSLRA of 1995.53 Moreover, the study supported 
the PSLRA’s intuition that having courts appoint a lead plaintiff and 
doing so pursuant to a rebuttable presumption that the investor with 
the largest alleged loss is the most adequate representative for the 
class. Repeated studies coauthored by Professor Thomas have 
consistently shown a statistical correlation between better settlements 
(as a function of the percentage of provable losses recovered) and 
institutional lead plaintiffs.54 The research also supported efforts by the 
plaintiffs’ bar to justify the aggregation of claims as a way to establish 
a group to serve as a lead plaintiff, since Does the Plaintiff Matter? 
found that aggregation yielded better outcomes than an individual 
 
 50. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 6, at 1767 (concluding that the threat of derivative suits 
plays little role in the governance of private firms). 
 51. See discussion supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.  
 52. See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An 
Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1631 
(2006). 
 53. Compare Alexander, supra note 3, at 516–17 (questioning whether the merits of such 
suits actually impact settlement figures and thus matter), with Cox et al., supra note 52.  
 54. Cox et al., supra note 52, at 1638–39. 
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investor with a smaller claim.55 To be sure, any study of case outcomes 
across classes of investors is subject to certain forms of possible 
selection bias. For example, the better outcomes garnered in cases 
where the lead plaintiff is a financial institution may well be explained 
by institutions cherry-picking the suits in which they so participate, 
stepping forward only in cases that appear to be stronger, with larger 
provable losses.56 This supposition, however, is friendly to securities 
class actions, as it suggests the plaintiff is a powerful signal of the suit’s 
qualities, a message that can assume weight in applying the PSLRA’s 
heightened pleading requirement. Claims once made that private suits 
are parasitic to government enforcement actions were clearly rebutted 
by SEC Enforcement Heuristics, which found that within the large 
realm of securities class actions, a government enforcement action, such 
as by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), existed only 
about fifteen percent of the time and the SEC targeted smaller issuers, 
in which investors suffered lower provable losses and the defendant was 
suffering financial distress.57 
There Are Plaintiffs . . . and There Are Plaintiffs bifurcated the 
study sample of settlements according to their size and, by doing so, 
provided useful insights into the nature of shareholder suits.58 
Securities class action suits ending in small settlements, those smaller 
than $2–3 million, have long been suspected of being “strike suits”—
suits without much merit brought primarily to extort a settlement that 
provides fees to the attorney but little to nothing to class members.59 In 
a study of 225 cases filed in the period 1993–2004 that were settled for 
$3 million or less, Professor Thomas and coauthors found that 
settlements occurred substantially more quickly and recovered a lower 
percentage of investor losses than for settlements greater than $3 
million; surprisingly, neither the presence of an institutional investor 
nor a parallel SEC enforcement action improved settlement results.60 
The authors concluded, “[T]hese small settlement cases appear to 
exhibit the characteristics commonly associated with strike suits: small 
cash settlements that represent a small percentage of investors’ 
damages.”61 The authors suggested that small settlements appear to 
 
 55. Id. at 1638–39.  
 56. See id. at 1591.  
 57. See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An 
Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 777–78 (2003). 
 58. See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are 
Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 358 
(2008). 
 59. Id. at 380. 
 60. Id. at 382–84. 
 61. Id. at 383. 
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involve single reporting events that are quickly corrected (thereby 
mitigating investor losses) by small issuers who can be seen as easy 
prey for a settlement.62 The study also closely investigated whether 
settlement experience is different for public pension funds and labor 
pension funds; the authors found no statistically significant difference 
between the outcomes for these institutions.63 The authors thus rejected 
the criticism sometimes made that plaintiffs’ law firms abuse their 
relationships with labor pension funds.64 
Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers shined a light on 
massive slumbering that existed in the winding up of securities class 
actions.65 While the debate had historically focused on the suits being 
vexatious and enriching only the legal profession, this study of 
institutional participation in securities class action settlements showed 
that, in the average settlement, only twenty-eight percent of eligible 
institutional investors (those who had claims in a settlement) 
submitted claims.66 That is, an astoundingly low seventy-two percent of 
institutions who were includable in the class because they had traded 
during the period the deception existed actually submitted a claim to 
the class action administrator. The article went beyond documenting 
and lamenting laxity; it offered multiple possible explanations for such 
slumbering as well as steps that could be expected to increase investor 
participation in settled securities class actions.67 It is our 
understanding that the article provoked dramatic changes in behavior 
among institutional investors so that the securities class action today 
stands on much better footing. 
In Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers, the authors share 
their perspectives on the social value of the securities class action based 
on their studies. They write that this is a legal institution that is 
working reasonably well until measured against a compensatory goal.68 
The numerous studies of securities class actions, while documenting 
that the amount of provable losses are a powerful variable in explaining 
the size of settlements, also reflect that settlements yield a very small 
portion of investor losses. As such, the securities class action fails to 
 
 62. Id. at 385. 
  63. Id. at 370–71.  
 64. Id. at 385. 
 65. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: 
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate 
in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411 (2005). 
 66. See id. at 424.  
 67. See id. at 444–49. 
 68. See id. at 414. 
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measure well as a means to compensate investors for reporting 
skullduggery:  
Compensation and deterrence do not work at cross purposes; instead, they should be seen 
as supporting each other. If class actions are not fulfilling a compensatory function, then 
we need to pay more attention to whether they deter fraud. . . . [W]e believe that the focus 
in these cases must shift from trying to conscript a company’s resources to compensate 
class members to instead imposing a sanction of sufficient size and content to deter others 
from failing to monitor their reporting mechanisms, which in turn deters fraudulent 
reporting.69 
Simply put, if compensation is the only metric by which the 
securities class action is judged, it will never be seen as anything other 
than wasteful. 
II. SHAREHOLDER VOTING 
Professor Thomas has followed a similarly neutral approach to 
shareholder voting, examining fundamental questions such as when 
shareholders should have the right to vote and why, what the 
implications of shareholder voting are in particular contexts, and how 
the shareholder franchise should be protected or reformed. Professor 
Thomas’s scholarship provides both explicit and implicit answers to 
these questions.  
His explicit approach has been to develop a theory of shareholder 
voting, based on both empirical evidence and arguments about 
economic incentives and costs. His implicit approach has been to 
consider shareholder voting as an important, often crucial, aspect of the 
role of corporations and their actors in society. The implicit message in 
Professor Thomas’s scholarship on shareholder voting is that 
shareholder voting rights should be stronger when voting is of high 
value and weaker when voting is of low value; this proposition might 
seem obvious, but it has emerged from Professor Thomas’s work in 
subtle and often surprising ways. 
A. Theories of Shareholder Voting Rights 
First, the explicit part. Explicitly, Professor Thomas, along with 
his coauthors, set forth a model of shareholder voting. The model is 
more subtle and reality based than many prior models of shareholder 
voting. It does not highlight simple buzzwords. Nor is it 
straightforward. But the theory, overall, is a kind of intellectual 
compromise, an argument for the existence of shareholder voting that 
is flexible and rooted in positive observation and empirics. 
 
 69. Id. at 452 (footnotes omitted).  
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In a 2015 article, Professor Thomas and his colleague Paul 
Edelman develop a model of corporate voting.70 They ask why 
shareholders vote, but other stakeholders do not.71 They critique other 
models of voting, including models that rely on shareholders being the 
residual claimants of the firm, and conclude that the best reason to give 
shareholders a vote is that the sole certainty of return to shareholders 
is tied to improvements in the price of shares.72 This is a subtle 
difference: the relationship between shareholder and share prices is not 
as absolute as in theories based on the status of shareholders as 
residual claimants (in part because shareholders are not necessarily 
residual claimants, as in a firm that issues warrants). The authors 
stress the importance of the correlation between shareholders’ interests 
and the price of shares without going down the residual claimant rabbit 
hole.73 
Professors Edelman and Thomas argue that shareholders 
deserve a voice, and therefore a vote, under their theory, but that there 
is no legal requirement for the board “to maximize the short run 
[shareholder] price[s].”74 Accordingly, their theory is balanced with 
respect to the firm mandate that results from their observations about 
shareholders and share prices. A corollary to their argument is that 
stakeholders do not deserve the same degree of voice, because they are 
less exposed to stock price variation.75 But they are not as firm in this 
argument as are those in the earlier law and economics mindset. 
Instead, the difference between shareholders and stakeholders is 
relatively subtle, and along a continuum; it is not necessarily 
categorical. 
Thus, their theory occupies a middle ground between theories 
based on agency costs and the residual claimant status of shareholders 
on one hand, and stakeholder theories that reject shareholder wealth 
maximization as an optimal firm objective on the other. The article 
further argues that shareholder voting generates costs, and therefore 
should be limited to significant matters—again, a middle-ground, 
compromise position.76 
 
 70. See Randall S. Thomas & Paul H. Edelman, The Theory and Practice of Corporate Voting 
at U.S. Public Companies, in THE RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 459 (Jennifer 
G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015). 
 71. Id. at 459.  
 72. See id. at 460–64. 
 73. See id. at 464–65. 
 74. See id. at 465. 
 75. Id. at 466.  
 76. See id. at 468–69 (“Nevertheless, the costs of voting must be acknowledged and it is only 
efficient to have a vote if the benefits to the share price are likely to exceed them.”). 
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In a 2016 article, Professors Edelman and Thomas join with 
Professor Robert Thompson, and they collectively offer an expanded 
theory of shareholder voting, adding two theories supporting the 
existence of shareholder voting: (1) an information aggregation theory, 
whereby shareholder voting provides a superior way to aggregate 
private information when there is uncertainty about decisions, and (2) 
a heterogenous preferences theory, whereby shareholder voting 
provides a superior way to make decisions that differentially affect 
shareholders.77 The authors then apply the new expanded theory to a 
wide range of corporate practices, some of which allocate voting rights 
and decision authority to shareholders and some of which allocate 
voting rights and decision authority to management.78  
This expanded theory is also empirically based and open to 
compromise. It recognizes the importance of shareholder voting, but 
situates shareholder voting rights in their ability to resolve the above 
two aggregation problems. The theory is flexible, in that the importance 
of shareholder voting can vary depending on the need for information 
aggregation or the degree of heterogeneity among shareholders.79 
Essentially, Professor Thomas and his coauthors are saying that 
shareholder voting rights are important but should vary depending on 
a number of factors. It is a balanced and subtle theory. It is derived from 
observations about extant voting practices but is also critically aware 
of tensions in the allocation of rights among participants in the firm. At 
its core, this theory of shareholder voting is contextual, yet intuitive: for 
many significant decisions, shareholders should have a vote; for other 
less significant decisions, they should not. Again, it is a balanced 
approach. 
B. Categories of Shareholders and Their Uses of Voting Rights 
Implicit messages about shareholder voting rights arise in 
numerous ways in Professor Thomas’s scholarship, some of which are 
obvious and some less so. One theme of his scholarship has been to 
analyze separate categories of shareholders and gather information 
about how they approach different strategies, including how they use 
voting rights. Two examples are labor unions as shareholders and 
hedge fund activists as shareholders, both of which have attempted to 
use shareholder voting rights in quite different ways. 
 
 77. See Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in 
an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1380–82 (2014). 
 78. See id. at 1407–33. 
 79. See id. at 1364. 
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For example, Professor Thomas’s balanced approach to 
assessing shareholder voting rights is reflected in his 1998 article 
coauthored with Professor Stuart Schwab on shareholder activism by 
labor unions.80 Professors Schwab and Thomas analyze voting by labor 
unions as shareholders in great detail; it is worth reflecting on the 
prescience of the article, as well as the extent to which it remains 
relevant today. During the 1990s, labor unions had in many ways been 
a polarizing force in society, and Professors Schwab and Thomas focus 
on the potential for change through the unified incentives of labor 
unions and other shareholders.81 They observe an increase in the use of 
corporate voting by union members and pension funds to press for 
changes in corporate governance;82 that is the coauthors’ hook for 
analyzing the actual changes and potential utility of the new 
involvement by labor unions in exercising shareholder voting rights.83  
The authors distinguish among a range of voting rights that 
labor union shareholders exercised at the time, citing voting related to 
shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 as a “largely ineffective 
method[ ] for focusing shareholders and directors on a limited number 
of corporate-governance issues.”84 They cite the relatively newer focus 
on corporate governance as having greater potential than other 
precatory Rule 14a-8 proposals, in part because corporate governance 
proposals and voting related to such proposals were designed to appeal 
more widely to nonlabor shareholders.85 They argue that “unions need 
to focus their shareholder voting initiatives in areas where they have 
special advantages in monitoring management.”86 
As with so much of Professor Thomas’s scholarship, the 
conclusions derive from the empirics. Professors Schwab and Thomas 
collect proxy voting data and examine proposals from the 1994 and 1995 
proxy seasons.87 Their analysis expands on prior work Professor 
Thomas did with Professor Kenneth Martin, which found that labor 
shareholders frequently supported management, and that labor-
 
 80. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: 
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998). 
 81. See id. at 1037 (“Unions have the capability and incentive to play a beneficial monitoring 
role for shareholders.”). 
 82. See id. at 1042–74.  
 83. The corporate governance changes they cite include the redemption of shareholder rights 
plans, confidential shareholder voting, and restrictions on executive pay. See id. at 1020. They also 
discuss “Just Vote No” campaigns, in which unions and other shareholders withhold their approval 
for director candidates to demonstrate their disapproval. Id. at 1072–74. 
 84. Id. at 1024. 
 85. Id. at 1061. 
 86. Id. at 1025. 
 87. See id. at 1045. 
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sponsored shareholder proposals did no better than proposals 
submitted by public institutions.88 Professors Schwab and Thomas 
compile labor shareholder actions on shareholder proposals, including 
details about sponsors, the nature of proposals, and their status.89 They 
emphasize that unions had been engaging in a tactical approach, 
attempting to demonstrate to other shareholders that they could play a 
positive role in maximizing the value of firms, not an antagonistic one 
(the article suggests that a more strategic approach, rather than a 
tactical one, might generate more favorable results).90 Still, Professors 
Schwab and Thomas frame the union shareholders’ new role as a 
centrist one, adopting “a platform of maximizing long-term growth for 
shareholders and other stakeholders, as well as for themselves.”91 
Shareholder voting rights also are an important part of 
Professor Thomas’s work on shareholder activism. In two significant 
articles, Professor Thomas addresses the phenomenon of shareholder 
activism, finding that the announcement of activism by hedge funds is 
associated with a statistically significant abnormal return during the 
window surrounding announcement.92 These two articles examine 
closely the variation in announcement returns, as well as subsequent 
changes at targeted companies. Shareholder voting rights loom large in 
both of these projects. In the 2008 article, the authors emphasize that 
the activists occupy a kind of “sweet spot” ownership, typically between 
five and ten percent, so that they need to obtain support from other 
shareholders on matters requiring a shareholder vote.93 This ownership 
level and objective distinguishes shareholder activism fundamentally 
from the corporate raiders of the 1980s, who sought one hundred 
percent voting control.94 
In the 2016 article, the authors explore the variation among 
hedge fund activists’ success, hypothesizing that the success could be 
due to (1) learning from more frequent interventions, (2) skill as 
demonstrated by past success, or (3) “clout and expertise.”95 The 
 
 88. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to Make 
Shareholder Proposals?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 73 (1998). 
 89. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 80, at 1091 tbl.1. 
 90. See id. at 1090. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, 
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1755–57 (2008) (finding that “62% 
of the events see positive abnormal returns in the” twenty days before and twenty days after the 
announcement); C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, The Second Wave of Hedge 
Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296, 298–
300, 304 (2016) (“The average 21-day announcement period abnormal return was 7.17% . . . .”). 
 93. See Brav et al., supra note 92, at 1748.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Krishnan et al., supra note 92, at 297. 
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analysis suggests that the third category is associated with the greatest 
success, in part because of the demonstrated capacity to target 
entrenched firms, a willingness to express intent to replace directors, 
and a history of initiating, litigating, and winning proxy rights.96 
Effectively, the most successful firms are those that demonstrate a 
capacity to muster the shareholder support necessary to mount a 
credible threat to a board. Obviously, the ability to persuade other 
shareholders to vote alongside the activist hedge fund is a central part 
of such successful strategies. 
C. Voting Rights in Varied Contexts 
Finally, shareholder voting rights also emerge in areas of 
Professor Thomas’s research where voting itself is not central, or the 
immediate topic of interest, but voting nevertheless occupies an 
important space, and lessons and insights about shareholder voting 
abound. For example, Professor Thomas has examined several 
innovative and previously unexamined business practices where 
shareholder voting emerges as an important subsidiary topic. 
Consider the relationship among private equity, financial 
innovation, and corporate governance. Professor Thomas has expressed 
skepticism about financial innovation, arguing that its tendency to 
distort voting incentives and voting are potentially problematic. An 
article with Professor Ronald Masulis argues that one reason for the 
success of private equity is the weakening of public company 
governance that arose along with financial innovation (and that 
accordingly created opportunities for private equity firms to add value 
by taking firms private).97 For example, some shareholder decisions 
might be contrary to a firm’s economic interest, because derivatives 
skew the shareholders’ incentives with respect to firm value.98 This 
argument, too, occupies a “middle ground” among scholars: it criticizes 
the phenomenon of private equity, but does so in a subtle way, by 
suggesting that new and complex changes in the markets created 
opportunities for private equity firms, and further arguing that going-
 
 96. See id. at 312. 
 97. See Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The 
Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 258–59 
(2009) (describing the weakening oversight of public company boards).  
 98. See id. at 242 (noting that financial accounting systems poorly track risk associated with 
derivatives, which undermines investors’ ability to buy and sell in an informed manner). 
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private transactions could be value enhancing because of the increased 
agency costs associated with changes at public firms.99  
Or consider Professor Thomas’s assessment of appraisal rights. 
When shareholders began voting no (or abstaining) in increasing 
numbers and then seeking appraisal, Professor Thomas was quick to 
analyze the impact of the new phenomenon, presenting with coauthors 
the first large-scale empirical study of the increased use of appraisal 
from 2000 to 2014.100 Professor Thomas and his coauthors compare the 
likelihood of appraisal petitions depending on the degree of perceived 
conflicts of interest, and find that deals with greater conflicts are more 
likely to generate appraisal petitions.101 They also find that appraisal 
generated significant annualized returns: an average of 32.9 percent 
during the sample, which explains at least in part why petitions had 
become more frequent.102 Notwithstanding these dramatic returns, this 
article takes a balanced approach, noting that two recent changes in 
Delaware law (requiring a minimum stake and limiting interest 
payments) reduced the incentives to file appraisal petitions.103  
Finally, Professor Thomas also took a balanced approach to 
shareholder voting in a 2016 article analyzing shareholder voting on 
“bundled” items.104 The notion of bundling is potentially problematic: 
managers could distort shareholder choice by bundling several items 
together for voting purposes.105 For example, multiple voting items 
might be combined into a single box on the proxy card. In 1992, the SEC 
introduced “Unbundling Rules” to restrict this potentially harmful 
practice.106 Professor Thomas and coauthors evaluate those rules. They 
examine the rules themselves,107 along with judicial interpretations of 
the rules,108 and also look at voting policies (or the lack of voting 
policies) that potentially could address voting on bundled proposals.109  
 
 99. See id. at 221 (characterizing the trend of greater private equity ownership as a “value-
creating response”). 
 100. See Wei Jiang, Tao Li, Danqing Mei & Randall Thomas, Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy 
or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J.L. & ECON. 697 (2016) (answering the question posed in the title by 
suggesting that the evidence supports an interpretation that the increase in appraisal petitions is 
a form of litigation arbitrage). 
 101. Id. at 727. 
 102. See id. at 699, 721 tbl.11. 
 103. See id. at 700.  
 104. See James D. Cox, Fabrizio Ferri, Colleen Honigsberg & Randall S. Thomas, Quieting the 
Shareholders’ Voice: Empirical Evidence of Pervasive Bundling in Proxy Solicitations, 89 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1175 (2016).  
 105. See id. at 1187.  
 106. Id. at 1178, 1189; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3), (b)(1) (2019).  
 107. See Cox et al., supra note 104, at 1187–89.  
 108. See id. at 1189–94. 
 109. See id. at 1201–04.  
1. Cox Partnoy Introduction & Partnoy_PAGE 11/16/2019 10:35 AM 
1774 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:6:1755 
The article also gathers a large dataset of shareholder votes to 
test the extent of impermissible bundling based on several different 
definitions.110 The incidence of bundling in the data is high: almost 
twenty-nine percent of management proposals had some form of 
bundling.111 Accordingly, the authors recommend policy changes to 
address the challenges associated with bundling.112 As with Professor 
Thomas’s other work on shareholder voting, the article is even-handed 
and based on the empirical evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Our goal in discussing some of Professor Thomas’s articles on 
shareholder litigation and voting is to demonstrate that in both areas, 
he has taken a “depolarizing” approach. He has tackled significant 
problems as an empiricist, not as an advocate. He does not favor 
shareholders or managers. Instead, he engages in high-quality 
empirical study of interesting questions related to shareholder rights, 
letting the chips fall where the data show they do. 
We want to close by noting three overarching themes of 
Professor Thomas’s scholarship, aspects of his work that go beyond the 
substance of his contributions and cement his legacy as a valuable 
contributor to the world’s stock of knowledge. These three themes are: 
coauthoring, impartiality, and breadth.  
First, before the articles we discuss here were published, 
coauthoring was a rare phenomenon among law professors. Many 
academics viewed coauthoring skeptically, and often would question the 
relative contributions of each colleague. Others saw coauthoring as an 
enterprise fraught with peril, including agency costs and misaligned 
incentives, and therefore avoided it. But Professor Thomas showed 
scholars a different way: he coauthored with friends and colleagues, and 
sustained those relationships before, during, and after the projects. He 
also demonstrated that there were real synergies to coauthoring, 
arising both from the comparative advantage brought by each author 
and also from the nature of the projects. 
Second, consistent with our view of the neutrality of Professor 
Thomas’s scholarship, his research is exemplary for its lack of agenda 
or emotion: he calls ‘em as he sees ‘em. It is difficult for us to predict, 
when we hear Professor Thomas is working on a topic, what the 
 
 110. See id. at 1229–36.  
 111. Id. at 1179.  
 112. See id. at 1236–38 (recommending the withdrawal of certain SEC guidance, an updated 
bundling definition, an expanded materiality standard, more attentive third-party voting advice, 
and mobilization of institutional investors). 
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outcome, finding, or recommendations of the finished product will be. 
Professor Thomas’s scholarship has been guided by the evidence, not 
the other way around. Sometimes his findings are pro-plaintiff; 
sometimes they are pro-defendant. Sometimes his articles appeal to 
those of a more liberal bent; sometimes they appeal to those of a more 
conservative bent. Thus, Professor Thomas has been a role model 
scholar, always investigating and exploring, eager to contribute 
knowledge, without hewing to any particular ideology or world view. 
Finally, the breadth of Professor Thomas’s scholarship is 
extraordinary. We have highlighted his articles covering just two areas: 
shareholder litigation and shareholder voting. But he has also written 
widely about other topics, including another main shareholder right— 
the right to sell shares. For example, in a forthcoming paper, 
Understanding the (Ir)Relevance Of Shareholder Votes On M&A Deals, 
Professor Thomas and his coauthors analyze data reflecting significant 
share ownership transfers from long-term holders to short-term holders 
during the quarter in which acquisitions are announced.113 They find 
that many institutional shareholders exit after the announcement of a 
deal reflects the option value of the transaction, and conclude that any 
price effects are rarely sufficient to discipline managers. This paper is 
but one example, and we expect to see many more. 
We have been honored to work with Professor Thomas and to 
know him as a friend, colleague, and world-class scholar. We celebrate 
his work on shareholder rights here and note that his depolarized 
approach might be of some benefit more broadly. If evidence is normally 
distributed, a debatable but perhaps not unreasonable proposition, one 
should not expect scholarship based on evidence consistently to appear 
at the tails of the distribution. It is a sign of the strength of Professor 
Thomas’s research that his scholarship falls in the middle of the 
distribution, right where one would expect a neutral empiricist’s work 
to fall. 
 
 
 113. See James D. Cox, Tomas J. Mondino & Randall S. Thomas, Understanding the 
(Ir)Relevance of Shareholder Votes on M&A Deals, 69 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2019). 
